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1      Introduction 
 
Following the adoption of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 (Civil Union Act) on 1 
December 2006, South Africa became one of very few countries to confer legal 
protection and marriage benefits on partners in same-sex relationships. The 
legislation was adopted as a direct response to the landmark decision of the 
Constitutional  Court  in  Minister  of  Home  Affairs  v  Fourie.
1  The  Court  had 
declared  the  lack  of  the  legal  recognition  of  same-sex  relationships 
unconstitutional and  had  given  Parliament  a  period  of  one  year in  which  to 
develop  a  remedy  that  would  allow  same-sex  partners  to  formalise  their 
relationships. The Court had also cautioned Parliament to be sensitive and not 
to provide a remedy that would be calculated and perceived as producing new 
forms of marginalisation.
2 
 
In this regard, Parliament opted to develop a separate institution of marriage, 
apart from the existing forms of marriage such as civil or customary marriages.
3 
This  new  institution  of  marriage  has  generated  extensive  and  complex 
questions in relation to the quality of legal protection accorded to partners in 
same–sex relationships. These questions touch on very broad issues such as 
institutional, social and religious beliefs, views and opinions, civil rights, ethics, 
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values and principles.
4 They undermine the development of a single strategy 
that will draw an appropriate balance between certain competing rights such as 
the rights to freedom of sexual orientation and f reedom of religion. Such a 
balance may, however, be necessary to ensure that the substantive translation 
of the right to equality is an actuality for couples in same-sex relationships. 
 
The purpose of this contribution is to provide a succinct overview and  analysis 
of the features of the Act. The objective is to determine the significance of the 
Act for the substantive translation of the right to freedom of sexual orientation 
vis-à-vis the right to freedom of religion within the framework of the right to 
equality. 
 
It  is  argued,  firstly,  that  the  Act  has  the  potential  to  produce  new  forms  of 
marginalisation, despite the caution by the Court. Secondly, the categorisation 
of marriages into heterosexual and homosexual marriages or civil unions has 
created legal uncertainty about the essence of the notion of equal rights for all, 
without distinction, as envisaged in the Constitution. Lastly, the allocation of 
people  into  various  categories  rather  than  allowing  them  to  be  just  'human 
beings'  could  defeat  the  purpose  of  establishing  a  'just'  society  based  on 
democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights.  
 
The intention is not to argue for a  'one-size-fits-all' approach, but to identify 
some of the factors which may be a barrier to the implementation of the Act and 
which could undermine the equal worth of persons in same-sex relationships. 
This  contribution  is  therefore  limited  to  an  examination  of  the  quality  of  the 
protection accorded to same-sex couples, and does not include an analysis of 
the  nature  of  the  institution  of  marriage  itself  or  the  theological  and  social 
dimensions of same-sex marriages.
5 
 
                                            
4     See  Robinson  and  Swanepoel  2004  PER  87-135.  They  had  already  identified  the 
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2  The general features of the Act  
 
The Constitutional Court has emphasised that the legislature is better placed to 
find  the  best  ways  of  ensuring  that  people  do  not  live  in  a  state  of  'legal 
blankness'.
6  The Court's emphasis on the role of the legislature is deeply 
entrenched in the various sections of the Bill of Rights of the South African 
Constitution. The legislature has to adopt special legal m easures (such as the 
design and adoption of statute law) in ensuring the facilitation of fundamental 
change as far as the elimination of inequalities and discrimination lingering from 
the past are concerned. The impact of the historic past on the promotion  of 
human rights is clearly expressed by Mahomed DP in Azapo v President of the 
Republic of South Africa,
7 where he stresses that: 
 
fundamental human rights became a major casualty of the conflict between 
the  minority  which  reserved  for  itself  all  control  over  the  political 
instruments  of  the  state  and  the  majority  who  sought  to  resist  the 
domination  and  where  their  resistance  was  met  by  the  laws  that  were 
designed to counter the effectiveness of such resistance.
8 
 
The requirement for the development of legal measures in the quest for the 
elimination of inequalities and discrimination is also endorsed in the preamble 
of the Promotion of Equality and the Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act
9 
which provides that: 
 
the  prohibition  of  unfair  discrimination  and  the  promotion  of  the 
achievement  of  equality  requires  the  development  of  special  legal  and 
other measures, of historically disadvantaged individuals, communities and 
social groups who were dispossessed of their land and resources, deprived 
of their human dignity and who continue to endure such consequences. 
 
The adoption of the measures referred to here the engagement of a proactive 
and  activist  legislature  in  order  to  achieve  the  objectives  envisaged  in  the 
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Equality  Act  and  the  Constitution.  The  Constitutional  Court  in  Carmichele  v 
Minister of Safety and Security
10 supports this view: 
 
there is a duty imposed on the state and all of its organs not to perform any 
act that infringes these rights. In some circumstances there would also be 
a positive component  which obliges the state  and its organs to provide 
appropriate protection to everyone through laws and structures designed to 
afford such protection.
11 
 
The adoption of the Civil Union Act therefore took place within the context and 
against  the  background  of  affirming  the  legitimacy  of  the  development  of 
measures  that  are  designed  to  protect  persons  or  categories  of  persons 
previously disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.
12 It takes into account South 
Africa's  history,  and  the  prejudicial  context  that  peopl e  in  same -sex 
relationships find themselves in - even in the new constitutional dispensation.
13 
Effectively, it gives due recognition to the fact that the elimination of systematic 
discrimination against people in same -sex relationships cannot be achieved 
without positive action being taken by the state.
14 
 
This Act was adopted in the context of a specific rights perspective, in order to 
protect the rights of people in same-sex relationships,
15 who are often and are 
most vulnerable to discrimination and persecution. The normative impetus and 
the specific focus behind the adoption of the Act is to be found in section 9 of 
the  Constitution.
16  This  provision  provides  a  sound  framework  for  the 
                                            
10    2001 (10) BCLR 995 (CC). 
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substantive translation and equal enjoyment of all fundamental rights in the Bill 
of Rights. It puts an emphasis on the centrality of the principles of equality and 
non-discrimination.  These  principles  serve  as  the  core  foundation  for  the 
development of the national agenda for the promotion of equal rights for all 
people, including couples in same-sex relationships. 
 
In  addition,  the  entrenchment  of  equality  as  a  foundational  value  in  the 
Constitution
17 plays a significant role as far as the interpretation and limitation 
of fundamental rights is concerned. Jagwanth argues that it may be used by the 
courts even where the right is not directly invoked, allowing the substantive 
principle of equality to be the lens through which the application of the law 
should take place.
18  The centrality of equality as a foundational value was 
endorsed by the Court in  Minister of Finance v Van Heerden,
19 where it held 
that:  
 
the achievement of equality is not only a guaranteed and justiciable right in 
our Bill of Rights but also a core and foundational value; a standard which 
must  inform  all  law  and  against  which  all  law  must  be  tested  for 
constitutional consonance.
20 
 
The value-based approach to the right to equality in the context of the  Civil 
Union Act is viewed as a progressive and transformative tool that seeks not 
only  to  remedy  the  injustices  and  ills  of  the  past
21  but also to ensure the 
development of affirmative measures in order to pave the way for the future 
achievement of equality for same-sex couples. The emphasis on the promotion 
of foundational values complements the purpose of the new con stitutional and 
democratic order. The purpose of such an emphasis is to affirm the need for 
the establishment of a society in which all human beings, including same -sex 
                                                                                                                               
grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that the discrimination 
is fair. 
17   See s 1, which provides that the Republic of South Africa is one sovereign, democratic 
state  founded  on  the  values  of  human  dignity,  the  achievement  of  equality,  the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms, non-racialism and non-sexism. 
18   Jagwanth "Expanding Equality" 131. 
19   2004 11 BCLT 1125 (CC). 
20   2004 11 BCLT 1125 (CC) par 22. 
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couples,  are  accorded  equal  dignity  and  respect,  regardless  of  their 
membership of particular groups.
22  
 
The intersection of the right to equality and the right to human dignity
23  as 
envisaged in the preamble of the Act is of the utmost importance. The centrality 
of these rights, both in the Constitution and the Act bears witness to the lessons 
drawn from the past, that make these rights the cornerstone and foundational 
values in reconstructing the future of couples in same -sex relationships. The 
interdependence of these rights was similarly expressed by Sachs J in National 
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice
24 as follows: 
 
the  equality  principle  and  the  dignity  principle  should  not  be  seen  as 
competitive  but  rather  as  complementary.  Inequality  is  established  not 
simply  through  group-based  differential  treatment,  but  through 
differentiation which perpetuates disadvantage and leads to the scarring of 
the  sense  of  dignity  and  self-worth  associated  with  membership  of  the 
group. Conversely, an invasion of dignity is more easily established when 
there is an inequality of power and status between the violator and the 
victim.
25 
 
In essence, the interdependence of these rights (the right to equality and the 
right to human dignity) provides a firm basis for a deeper understanding of the 
function of the law, including the Civil Union Act itself, in promoting the equal 
worth  of  all  human  beings.  It  enables  the  development  of  insight  into  the 
determination of the significance of the law in addressing both the underlying 
social and legal networks that limit the potential of the law to generate social 
change. It forms the basis upon which to establish a set of demands based on 
the intrinsic worth of the individual. It asserts that the right to marry without 
regard to the sex of the parties is a fundamental right of all persons and that 
limiting the applicability of such a right to heterosexuals only is irrational and 
invidiously discriminatory.
26 The extension of the right  of equal opportunity to 
marriage for same-sex couples requires a positive action that directly benefits 
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such couples. Such action is necessary to contribute to the fulfilment of the 
government's commitment to eliminate all forms of discrimination and prejudice 
as required by section 7(2)
27 of the Bill of Rights.  
 
Overall, the Civil Union Act serves as a direct and accessible legal instrument 
in laying the foundation for the equal rights of people in same-sex relationships. 
It seeks to limit any potential for reliance on the courts for enforcing the right to 
equality because, as Mokgoro says,  'litigation tends to be the priv ilege of the 
economically empowered'.
28 
 
3  The negative features of the Act 
After  discussing  the  general  features  of  the  Civil  Union  Act,  it  would  be 
reasonable to harbour a suspicion that the Act does not pass the litmus test of 
equitability.
29  Although it  appears to have asserted the right to equality by 
extending equal access to  'marriage'  to same-sex couples, the Act seems 
flawed in some respects. The creation of a separate institution of 'marriage' has 
reduced the equal rights of couples in same-sex relationships to what Laycock 
et al refer to as a 'back-door' effort to undermine the general right to equality.
30 
The basis of this contention is the  'legal separateness'  affirmed in the  Civil 
Union Act,  which categorises people in South Africa into various gr oupings, 
confining them to particular  'closets'. The categorisation may hence relegate 
some  people  to  the  position  of  second -class  citizens.  It  further  gives  the 
impression that certain members of our society are not worthy of the equal 
protection envisaged in the Constitution. The view was similarly expressed by 
Sachs J in Moseneke v The Master:
31 
 
it is an affront to all of us that people are still treated as [heterosexuals and 
homosexuals]  rather  than  as  ordinary  persons  seeking  to  [enforce  their 
                                            
27    This section provides that 'the state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights 
in the Bill of Rights'. 
28    Mokgoro 2003 Albany Law Review 1. 
29    A term extracted from the former President Mbeki, 'ANC Today', 8 Aug 2002, about his 
quest for the promotion of equality in South Africa. 
30     See the review by Gill of Laycock, Picarello and Wilson (eds) Same-sex Marriage. 
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rights] and it is in conflict with the establishment of a [just society] where 
rights and duties are no longer determined by [sexual orientation].
32 
 
The legal separateness of the Act is informed by the fact that the Act firstly 
discriminatorily classifies the legal relationship of same-sex couples as 'unions', 
reducing them to nothing more than what the author would refer to as 'so-called 
marriages'. The classification of the relationships as 'unions' rather than actual 
'marriages' effectively worsens the continued intense suffering experienced by 
people in same-sex relationships. The right to a 'marriage' is not equal to the 
right to a 'union' as the Act itself seeks to deal with solemnisation of civil unions 
and  the  consequences  of  a  'civil  union'  which  is  not  a  'marriage'.
33  In this 
regard, the Civil Union Act has not, for example, defined what a marriage is
34 It 
only entitles the parties to a 'union' by way of a 'marriage' or 'civil partnership'.
35 
The lack of definition of the word 'marriage' in the Act creates uncertainty about 
the establishment of legal rules relating to the enforcement of equal rights 
within  the  context  of  couples  in  same -sex  relationships  vis-à-vis  those  in 
heterosexual relationships.  
 
Effectively, despite the invalidation of the common law definition of 'marriage' 
and section 30(1) of the Marriage Act
36 in Fourie, the Civil Union Act does not 
affect the definition of the word 'marriage'. It still reserves the use of the term 
'marriage'  exclusively  to  marriage  'between  a  man  and  a  woman  to  the 
exclusion of others', as is envisaged in the Marriage Act. It is uncertain whether 
the concept of 'marriage' is a distinct concept that remains unquestioned in law, 
despite its invalidation by the Court. This leaves open the question of whether 
or not the decision to adopt the Act was an attempt to avoid public opposition to 
same-sex marriages, especially by religious institutions.
37 
 
                                            
32     2001 2 BCLR 103 (CC) par 21. 
33     See the preamble of the Act. 
34     See s 1 of the Act. 
35     See s 2 (a) and (b). 
36   25 of 1961 (the Marriage Act).  See also O'Regan J's minority judgment concurring with 
the majority at par 164. 
37    See  Reddy  'The  same-sex  marriage  complex  in  South  Africa:  some  conceptual, 
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It is noticeable that the Act denies same-sex couples the status of 'marriage' 
enjoyed  by  heterosexual  couples.  It  could  therefore  violate  the  principles  of 
non-discrimination  on  the  basis  of  sexual  orientation.  The  Act  develops  a 
distinct set of constitutional principles in relation to the promotion of the right to 
equality for persons in same-sex relationships vis-à-vis people in heterosexual 
relationships. It does not provide for the requirements of a valid marriage and 
especially within the traditional value system in terms of customary law which 
requires negotiations and the payment of ilobola and other related requirements 
before the marriage can be solemnised. It also undermines section 2(3) of the 
Recognition  of  Customary  Marriages  Act,
38  which recognises the validity of 
polygamous  marriages  concluded  in  terms  of  the  customary  law  system 
(despite the concerns the author may have about these marriages). It furthers 
the injury to homosexual couples and compromises the laying of the foundation 
for the construction of new paradigms, which need to be affirmed.
39  
 
In addition, the legal categorisation of human relationships and huma n beings 
leaves a void in the determination of the context in and the extent to which the 
Civil Union Act may be examined in order to give effect to the affirmation of the 
equal rights of persons in same-sex relationships. The distinction strikes at the 
core of section 9(2) of the Bill of Rights as argued by Moseneke J in  Van 
Heerden.
40  Moseneke  J  argues  for  the  development  of  an  effective  tool 
designed to assist and ensure the promotion of the substantive equal rights of 
all people, including same-sex couples, who have been disadvantaged through 
unfair discrimination. Such categorisation further undermines the potential of 
the Civil Union Act itself as an affirmative measure designed to improve the 
quality of life of persons in same-sex relationships.
41  
 
In addition, section 3 of the Act endorses the legal separateness of same -sex 
couples in that it gives same -sex relationships an inferior status by providing 
that: 'this Act applies to civil partners joined in a civil union' only. 
                                            
38    120 of 1998 (hereafter Customary Act). 
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The section effectively establishes a 'gated community' of same-sex couples 
confined in a particular 'closet' different from that for heterosexual couples. It 
leaves  (especially  same-sex)  couples  without  an  option  as  to  whether  their 
relationship will fall under customary law or common law. It confines same-sex 
couples to engaging in 'so-called marriages,' which are defined as voluntary 
unions which are solemnised and registered by way of either a marriage or a 
civil partnership.
42 
 
It affirms the perception of civil marriages as bein g superior to customary 
marriages, which were not incorporated into the national legal framework until 
the  new  constitutional  dispensation  in  South  Africa.  Since  the  dawn  of 
democracy, South Africa has made inroads into and transformed its marital 
regime by recognising customary marriages.
43 The adoption of the Customary 
Act
44 furthered the social and legal evolution of the marital regime in South 
Africa by giving equal recognition to customary and civil marriages, and also to 
partners in those marriages.
45  
 
Although  the  issue  of  the  perception  of  the  superiority  of  civil  marriages 
requires  further  research  -  it  is  not  comprehensively  addressed  in  this 
contribution  -  it  may  be  pointed  out  that  the  perception  is  related  to  the 
provision of section 12 of the Customary Act. Section 12 requires the parties to 
a customary marriage to register it, even though the failure does not affect its 
validity. The validity  of customary marriages in terms of customary law is 
determined by the negotiations between the bride and  the groom's family, 
payment of  ilobola  and  other  procedural  requirements.
46  These  procedural 
requirements  were  valid  determinants  of  customary  marriages.  Section  12 
introduces  the  registration  of  customary  marriages  and  such  requirement 
undermines customary law as a legitimate system of law that is able to regulate 
                                            
42    See s 1 of the Act. 
43    See Andrews Washington and Lee Law Review 1483. 
44    See (n 37) above. 
45    See the preamble of the Customary Act. 
46    See Maithupfi and Bekker 2009 Obiter 164-174. N NTLAMA    PER / PELJ  2010(13)1 
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its  own  affairs  and  development.  It  reinforces  and  supplements  the  African 
value system with the Western conceptions of marriage, which are foreign to it, 
thus undermining the legitimacy of customary marriages.
47 
 
The Civil Union Act ignored and actually missed an opportunity for addressing 
some of the complex questions that may be raised, especially within the system 
of  customary  law  in,  relation  to  the  marriage  of  couples  in  same -sex 
relationships. These questions are related to procedural requirements such as 
the payment of ilobola. 
 
As  the  customary-law  system  is  uncodified  and  evolves  with  changing 
circumstances,  the  fact  that  the  Act  does  not  recognise  equal  access  to 
marriage either in terms of customary or common law puts couples in same-sex 
relationships  at  a  disadvantage.  It  increases  the  vulnerability  of  couples  in 
same-sex relationships, especially when they are beyond the borders of South 
Africa, and exposes them to persecution, as evidenced by the recent tabling of 
the  Ugandan  Bill  prohibiting  same-sex  relationships.
48  The  Act  may  also 
undermine South Africa's obligations under international law as envisaged in 
the preamble of the Equality Act, which provides that:  
 
South Africa also has international obligations under binding treaties and 
customary  international  law  in  the  field  of  human  rights  which  promote 
equality and prohibit unfair discrimination. 
 
In essence, this section has closed off an opportunity for parallel development 
of  the  existing  marital  regimes  within  the  context  of  partners  in  same-sex 
relationships.  It  implies  that  African  traditional  values  and  principles  are  too 
conservative in nature. Even if that were to be true,
49 the affirmation of the 
equal status of marital regimes through either common or customary law may 
                                            
47    See also Ngcobo J in Bhe v Khayelitsha Magistrate 2005 1 BCLR 1 (CC) par 212, 230 
and 235, where he argues that customary law should be allowed to develop within its 
own value system. 
48    See the report by Olukya Associated Press 8 January 2010. 
49     See the report by BBC News 'Homosexuality in Africa' 28 June 2002, in which it was 
reported that President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe described couples in same-sex 
relationships  as  being  worse  than  'dogs  or  pigs',  who,  because  of  their  'unnatural 
perversion', are not entitled to basic human rights. N NTLAMA    PER / PELJ  2010(13)1 
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have provided an opportunity for tolerance and accommodation of couples in 
same-sex  relationships  within  the  framework  especially  of  the  African  value 
system. 
 
Section 6 of the Act, which is intertwined with section 5, further provides that: 
 
a marriage officer, other than the one designated in terms of section 5, may 
in  writing  inform  the  Minister  that  he  or  she  objects  on  the  grounds  of 
conscience, religion and belief to solemnise a civil union between persons 
of the same sex, whereupon that marriage officer shall not be compelled to 
solemnise such civil union. 
 
The equal contest between the right to freedom of sexual orientation and the 
right to freedom of religion has made the development of the principles of non-
discrimination  subject  to  the  social,  moral  and  legal  convictions  of  those 
authorised to solemnise marriages. It allows the enforcement of equal rights to 
depend  on  the  willingness  of  marriage  officers  to  use  their  discretion  in 
balancing their constitutional rights to religion and the right of same-sex couples 
to  equal  benefit  of  the  law.  It  is  equally  striking  that  officers  employed  to 
conduct  public  service  in  line  with  the  values  and  principles  of  public 
administration
50  will  have  to  make  potential ly  difficult  decisions  whether  to 
marry same-sex couples or not. It has actually created a constitutional cross -
roads
51which same-sex couples will not be able to cross in order to solemnise 
their relationships as marriages. It reinforces the formal concepti on of the law 
without  actually  moving  beyond  its  own  limitations.  It  also  minimises  the 
specific-rights perspective which motivated the adoption of the Civil Union Act. 
 
Whether same-sex couples have access to marriage or not depends on the 
convictions  of  marriage  officers  who  often  do  not  wish  to  recognise  the 
difference between same-sex and heterosexual couples, wishing instead to 
eliminate the consequences of such differentiation. But the issue is whether or 
not heterosexual and same-sex couples are receiving identical treatment rather 
                                            
50     See s 195 of the Constitution and the Public Service Act 103 of 1994, which seek to 
regulate  and  improve  governance  in  public  administration  in  support  of  vision  and 
efficiency and increased public participation in governance.  
51    See Strasser On Same-sex Marriages 24. N NTLAMA    PER / PELJ  2010(13)1 
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than  whether or not the Civil Union Act, through its effective application and 
proper interpretation, will  be  able  to  eliminate  the unequal consequences of 
such differentiation. For example, by having adopted the Civil Union Act, the 
government has acknowledged that same-sex couples are identically situated 
to heterosexual couples in relation to the marital laws of South Africa.  
 
As argued elsewhere, the 'differentiation approach' not only prohibits differential 
treatment, but also allows for differentiation in appropriate cases to enhance the 
respect  and  the  promotion  of  fundamental  freedoms  for  everyone.
52  The 
identical treatment of similarly situated individuals (same-sex and heterosexual 
couples) without an adequate just ification of the legitimate purpose of the 
government runs contrary to the principles of non-discrimination.
53  
 
In this regard, the failure of the Act to recognise the difference between and 
identity of same-sex and heterosexual couples undermines the argu ment by 
Sachs J in Fourie, where he argues that: 
 
a  democratic,  universalistic,  caring  and  aspirationally  egalitarian  society 
embraces  everyone  and  accepts  people  for  who  they  are.  To  penalise 
people for being who and what they are is profoundly disrespectful of the 
human personality and violatory of equality. Equality means equal concern 
and respect across difference. It does not presuppose the elimination or 
suppression  of  difference.  Respect  for  human  rights  requires  the 
affirmation of self, not the denial of self. Equality therefore does not imply a 
levelling or homogenisation of behaviour or extolling one form as supreme, 
and  another  as  inferior,  but  an  acknowledgement  and  acceptance  of 
difference. At the very least, it affirms that difference should not be the 
basis for exclusion, marginalisation and stigma. At best, it celebrates the 
vitality that difference brings to any society.
54 
 
The identical treatment of different types of couples within the framework of the 
right to freedom of religion fails to acknowledge the significance of the law in 
dealing  with  both  the  legal  and  socially  constructed  roles  that  seek  to 
compromise the equal worth of the rights of same-sex couples. Such treatment 
undermines the already developed jurisprudence that has emanated from the 
                                            
52   See a further analysis in Ntlama 2009 Malawi Law Journal 117-132. 
53   See Klein and Redman Connecticut Law Review 1383-1396 and 1394. 
54    See Fourie par 60. N NTLAMA    PER / PELJ  2010(13)1 
204 / 234 
Constitutional  Court  on  equality,  that  focusing  on  the  impact  of  the 
differentiation  on  vulnerable  groups,  including  same-sex  couples.
55  The 
jurisprudence has put an emphasis on the substantive realisation of the right to 
equality. The purpose of s uch an emphasis is to establish a future that is 
founded on the ideals of reconciliation in and reconstruction of our society.
56 
The right to equal benefit of the law cannot be a  'throat-clearing' exercise, as 
argued by Sachs J in  Mhlungu,
57  if  it  has  to  equally  address  the  intense 
suffering of the past and the injustice which continues to manifest itself in this 
new constitutional dispensation.  
 
The contest between the right to freedom of religion and the right to freedom of 
sexual orientation in the Civil Union Act has made the substantive translation of 
the right to equality subject to a 'mere choice'. The choice enables the marriage 
officers  to  use  their  discretion,  forcing  them  to  draw  a  distinction  between 
people,  which  perpetuates  the  privileges  of  couples  in  heterosexual 
relationships, as argued by Langa CJ in MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal v 
Pillay
58 that: 
 
[the discretion] enforces mainstream and historically privileged forms ... at 
the expense of minority and historically excluded [groups]. It thus places a 
burden on [partners in same-sex relationships] who are unable to express 
themselves  fully  ...  in  an  environment  that  does  not  completely  accept 
them.
59 
 
The foundation for the relegation of substantive principles such as the right to 
equality to such a discretion or a “mere choice” was laid down by the Court in 
Fourie, where it was held that: 
 
religious  institutions  would  remain  undisturbed in  their  ability  to  perform 
marriage  ceremonies  according  to  their  own  tenets,  and  thus  if  they 
wished, to celebrate heterosexual marriages only.
60 
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The  choice  forces  marriage  officers  to  make  difficult  decisions  by  weighing 
different  considerations  on  what  would  constitute  an  allegiance  to  religious 
beliefs against the their faith in the equal worth of all people. This contention 
was affirmed by Sachs J in Christian Education of South Africa v Minister of 
Education,
61 who argues that: 
 
the  underlying  problem  in  any  open  and  democratic  society  based  on 
human dignity, equality and freedom in which conscientious and religious 
freedom has to be regarded with appropriate seriousness, is how far such 
democracy can and must go in allowing members of religious communities 
to define for themselves which laws they will obey and which not.
 
Such a 
society can cohere only if all its participants accept that certain basic norms 
and  standards  are  binding.  Accordingly,  believers  cannot  claim  an 
automatic right to be exempted by their beliefs from the laws of the land. At 
the same time, the state should, wherever reasonably possible, seek to 
avoid  putting  believers  to  extremely  painful  and  intensely  burdensome 
choices of either being true to their faith or else respectful of the law.
62 
(own emphasis).
  
 
Marriage officers subscribing to certain religious beliefs may marginalise same-
sex  couples  seeking  marriage  because  they  do  not  or  cannot  conform  to 
'perceived  certain  acceptable'  social  norms.
63  It  further  leaves  uncertainty 
regarding  the  genuineness  of  subscription  to  religious  beliefs  and  an 
unwillingness  to  solemnise  same -sex  marriages.  Although  the  above  falls 
outside the scope of this contribution, it may require resource -intensive further 
research. 
 
In essence, the  Civil Union Act does not put same-sex couples on an equal 
footing  with  heterosexual  couples  as  far  as  all  of  the  other   rights  and 
responsibilities enjoyed by the latter group are concerned. The right of access 
to marriage has become a prerogative of heterosexual couples. The Civil Union 
Act relegated this right to a secondary position for same -sex couples, thus 
systematically institutionalising their stigmatisation. The fact that the  'status' of 
marriage in the Civil Union Act is not available to same-sex couples is a cause 
for concern. It defeats any transformative value that the acceptance of same -
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sex  marriages  may  have  as  far  as  the  concept  'marriage'  is  concerned, 
because the Act does not deconstruct the old standing principle that marriage is 
between a 'man and a woman to the exclusion of others'.
64 
 
The denial of the equal status of marriage for same -sex couples compromises 
the potential of using the law as a strategy for social change. As Kakabadse 
puts it: 
 
law is an ideology of justice that encompasses equal accessibility which 
must lead to the results that are individually and socially just.
65 
 
In  this regard,  the  legal separateness  of  equal rights  for same-sex  vis-à-vis 
heterosexual couples has created a 'social, legal and constitutional dilemma' 
regarding the central role of the law and its impact on the manner in which 
members of society should relate to one another. The interdependence of law 
and  social  justice  provides  an  opportunity  for  examining  the  existence  of 
underlying social ills that could be harmful to our society.  
 
Of great concern is the fact that the interaction between the law and society 
forms  the  basis  for  understanding  not  only  the  law  itself,  but  also  broader 
issues  relating  to  equality  and  social  justice.  Sachs  J  in  Port  Elizabeth 
Municipality v Various Occupiers
66 framed the intersection of the law and social 
justice  within  the  prescripts  of  the  African  value  system,  which  embraces 
concepts such as 'ubuntu'”. He argued as follows: 
 
thus, [the law] expressly requires the court to infuse elements of grace and 
compassion  into  the  formal  structures  of  the  law.  It  is  called  upon  to 
balance  competing  interests  in  a  principled  way  and  promote  the 
constitutional vision of a caring society based on good neighbourliness and 
shared concern. The Constitution confirms that  we are not islands unto 
                                            
64    See the report by SAPA The Sowetan 28 January 2010, where it is reported that a 
complaint  of  hate  speech  has  been  laid  with  the  South  African  Human  Rights 
Commission in Mpumalanga against the Pan Africanist Youth Congress. It is alleged 
that the Youth Congress had gone to the extent of undermining not only the dignity of 
same-sex  couples  but  the  Constitution  itself,  as  quoted  in  the  newspaper:  'We  are 
saying  to  hell  with  the  SA  Constitution  for  giving  rights  to  gays  and  lesbians. 
Homosexuality is totally immoral and there is no place for gays and lesbians'. 
65    Kakabadse 2001 Women in Management Review 241. 
66    2004 12 BCLR 1268 (CC). N NTLAMA    PER / PELJ  2010(13)1 
207 / 234 
ourselves. The spirit of ubuntu, part of the deep cultural heritage of the 
majority  of  the  population,  suffuses  the  whole  constitutional  order.  It 
combines individual rights with a communitarian philosophy. It is a unifying 
motif  of  the  Bill  of  Rights,  which  is  nothing  if  not  a  structured, 
institutionalised and operational declaration in our evolving new society of 
the  need  for  human  interdependence,  respect  and  concern.
67  (own 
emphasis) 
 
Therefore, the disparity of equal access to marriage endorses an argument by 
Faundez that legal reform is a 'fatal attraction', as he contends that: 
 
the  adoption  of  these  laws  is  not  always  the  best  of  the  alternatives 
available to permeate every facet of the laws because social problems are 
not always resolved by enacting new rules. It is often the case that new 
legal rules are not the best solution either because there is no agreement 
in society as to the content of the rules or because the rules simply do not 
reach the group that they are meant to reach.
68 
 
Although  the  Civil  Union  Act  is  important  for  a  number  of  reasons,  the 
institutionalised  limitation  of  the  right  to  equal  access  to  marriage  gives 
credence to Faundez's argument. The Act does not give sufficient recognition 
to the status of same-sex couples. Despite the positive features of the Act, its 
adoption has created a separate status that strengthens the view that same-sex 
couples do not deserve the same status and respect as heterosexual couples. 
The positive features of the Act are outweighed by the disadvantages it brings 
for the recognition of the equal status of all marriages in South Africa. Overall, 
the factors discussed above, give effect to what Davis refers to as the 'emperor 
that is still naked',
69 as they pose difficulties in relation to the implementation of 
the Civil Union Act. 
 
4  Conclusion 
Having  provided  more  questions  than  answers,  the  Fourie  judgment  just 
captured  the  scenario  by  laying  the  foundation  for  the  adoption  of  the  Civil 
Union Act. This Act serves as the litmus test for the promotion and achievement 
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of  equality  in  South  Africa.  The  promotion  of  human-rights  standards  and 
obligations  associated  with  the  right  to  equality  remains  at  the  core  in 
consolidating our hard-fought democracy. South Africa's Constitution requires 
social,  legal  and  constitutional  equality,  but  the  fact  that  civil  marriages  or 
unions remain a separate institution for same-sex couples represents a real 
and powerful inequality.
70 Having the right to equality on paper means very little 
if it will not effectively impact on, and change the lives of couples in same -sex 
relationships. There is a danger that South Africa used the rhetoric of equality 
just to keep up appearances. 
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